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Abstract 
In her work on moral psychology and ethics, G. E. M. Anscombe articulates the 
Intended/Foreseen (I/F) distinction. Briefly, as the name indicates, the distinction contrasts the 
intended aspects of one’s act from those that one foresees, but does not intend. Anscombe insists 
that this distinction has great moral significance, even when applied to acts having comparable 
consequences. So, for example, Anscombe proposes that the intentional targeting of civilians 
(terror bombing) ethically differs from bombing a legitimate military target while concomitantly 
harming non-combatants with foresight but without intent (tactical bombing). While few deny 
that intent differs from foresight, some question the ethical relevance of contrasting the two in 
cases of consequentially comparable acts, such as (some) instances of terror and tactical 
bombing. This paper presents Anscombe’s reasons for regarding this distinction as one of signal 
ethical import. According to Anscombe, one finds the moral significance of the distinction in its 
relation to absolute prohibitions, the intrinsic badness of certain acts, the nature of virtue and 
vice, and, finally, the moral import of moral psychology itself. 
 Keywords: intention, foresight, double-effect reasoning, Anscombe, ethical relevance    
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The Ethical Relevance of the Intended/Foreseen Distinction According to Anscombe 
In her magisterial Modern Moral Philosophy (henceforth, MMP), G.E.M. Anscombe writes that: 
The denial of any distinction between foreseen and intended consequences, as far as 
responsibility is concerned, was not made by Sidgwick in developing any one ‘method of 
ethics’; he made this important move on behalf of everybody and just on its own account; 
and I think it plausible to suggest that this move on the part of Sidgwick explains the 
difference between old_fashioned utilitarianism and that consequentialism, as I name it, 
which marks him and every English academic philosopher since him. By it, the kind of 
consideration which formerly would have been regarded as a temptation, the kind of 
considerations urged upon men by wives and flattering friends, was given a status by 
moral philosophers in their theories. (Anscombe, 1958, p. 12) 
In MMP and elsewhere, Anscombe proposes the intended/foreseen (or I/F) distinction as crucial 
to resisting the descent into consequentialism (an ethical theory whose name she coins in the 
above passage). Speaking most precisely, the I/F distinction contrasts the intentional from what 
is voluntary but not intentional: 
Something is voluntary though not intentional if it is the antecedently known concomitant of 
one’s intentional action, so that one could have prevented it if one would have given up the 
action; but it is not intentional: one rejects the question ‘Why?’ in its connexion. (Anscombe, 
2000, section 49, p. 89) In disputes concerning the I/F distinction, one encounters three 
contested issues. First, how does one go about distinguishing intent from foresight? Second, how 
does one apply this distinction so as to vindicate the classic parsing of cases such that, for 
example, terror bombing of civilians counts as intended (and is, thereby, prohibited) while 
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consequentially comparable tactical bombing that concomitantly kills non-combatants counts as 
foreseen but not intended (and is not, thereby, prohibited)?1 Third, and perhaps most 
                                                          
1In her (presumably first published) treatment of double effect as an undergraduate in 1939 at 
twenty or so years of age (one notes she included it in her collected papers and acknowledges in 
her introduction to the same that she wrote this part of a pamphlet co-authored with Norman 
Daniels), we find: 
It has been argued that it is justifiable to attack civilians because their death is an 
example of “double effect”. But this is no example of double effect, which is 
exemplified when an action designed to produce one effect produces another as well by 
accident. If, for example, a military target is being attacked and in the course of the 
attack civilians are also destroyed, then their destruction is not wicked, for it is 
accidental. Obviously, before their destruction can be passed over on these grounds, it 
must also be shown that the action is of sufficient importance to allow such grave 
incidental effects. No action can be excused whose consequences involve a greater evil 
than the good of the action itself, whether these consequences are accidental or not 
[here the text has a footnote citing Aquinas’ founding account of double effect, Summa 
theologiae IIaIIae, q.64, a.7; Anscombe translates the relevant passage as: “The force 
used must be proportioned to the necessity.”] Double effect therefore only excuses a 
grave incidental consequence where the balance of the total effects of an action is on the 
side of the good. (1981a, p., 78) 
One notes that by “accidental” Anscombe has “not essential to the morality of the act” not “by 
accident” in mind; otherwise, the “must also be shown” would be otiose. 
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importantly, what moral relevance, if any, does this distinction have? That is, even if terror 
bombing does differ from consequentially comparable tactical bombing as the intended differs 
from the foreseen, why think that this difference makes for a moral difference between the two 
types of bombing such that terror bombing is nowise permissible while tactical bombing, further 
considerations such as necessity being met, is permissible? 
 In this paper, I address this third question by presenting what I take to be Anscombe’s 
account of the ethical relevance of the I/F distinction. I note at the outset that the bulk of 
Anscombe’s discussion of the I/F distinction does not concern this question. Indeed, to call her 
suggestions an account (might) go a little too far – particularly when one considers her work as it 
bears on the first two questions. For, concerning those issues Anscombe has extensive answers, 
found particularly in Intention, her insuperable treatment of action.2 However, as she insists, the 
                                                          
2In Intention, Anscombe understands herself to be addressing questions that have ethical import, 
but that precede ethics. So, for example, we find: “As for the importance of considering the 
motives of an action, as opposed to considering the intention, I am very glad not to be writing 
either ethics or literary criticism, to which this question belongs.” (Anscombe, 1958, section 12, 
p. 19) Elsewhere, she writes, “Now if intention is all important – as it is – in determining the 
goodness or badness of an action...” (Anscombe, 1981b, p. 59) Clearly, as she herself indicates in 
MMP, the fruit of work in moral psychology will largely be found in its bearing on ethics 
properly. That is, in the moral evaluation of acts and agents. One must look closely in her work 
to discern precisely why she regards intent as having the moral import she clearly ascribes to it. 
In Intention, for example, one tends to find only intimations of ethical import, such as: “Of 
course we have a special interest in human actions; but what is it that we have a special interest 
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distinction is critical. Thus, what she does have to say about its moral import, albeit less 
extensive and somewhat piecemeal, merits our consideration. 
 In Anscombe’s work, the most pressing reason for recourse to the I/F distinction depends 
upon the absolute prohibition of certain acts, no matter the consequences of not so acting (“do 
justice, even if the heavens fall” or fiat justitia, ruat coelum). In Anscombe’s account, these 
exceptionless prohibitions give us reasons for granting the I/F distinction ethical significance. 
Thus, I will first look at the relationship she sees as obtaining between absolute prohibitions and 
the distinction. 
The I/F Distinction and the Absolutely Prohibited: Refusals and Doings 
We find Anscombe locating the moral import of the I/F distinction (partially) in its support of 
absolute prohibitions: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in here?” (original emphasis, 1958, section 46, p.83) Ethics constitutes the special interest; moral 
psychology defines the noted what or subject matter, namely, action. 
The distinction between the intended, and the merely foreseen, effects of a voluntary 
action is indeed absolutely essential to Christian ethics. For Christianity forbids a number 
of things as being bad in themselves. But if I am answerable for the foreseen 
consequences of an action or refusal, as much as for the action itself, then these 
prohibitions will break down. If someone innocent will die unless I do a wicked thing, 
then on this view I am his murderer in refusing: so that all that is left to me is to weigh up 
evils. Here the theologian steps in with the principle of double effect and says: “No, you 
are no murderer, if the man’s death was neither your aim nor your chosen means, and if 
you had to act in the way that led to it or else do something absolutely forbidden.” 
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Without understanding of this principle, anything can be – and is wont to be – justified, 
and the Christian teaching that in no circumstances may one commit murder, adultery, 
apostasy (to give a few examples) goes by the board. ... the prohibitions are bedrock, and 
without them the Christian ethic goes to pieces. Hence the necessity of the notion of 
double effect. (Anscombe, 1981b, p. 58) 
Anscombe proposes to employ the I/F distinction to prevent absolute prohibitions from breaking 
down, under their own weight, as it were.3 She considers two paths by which they might break 
down via foreseen consequences associated with either what one refuses to do or with what one 
does. Since she herself first considers the case of foreseen consequences associated with what 
one refuses to do, let us do so, too. We will then consider the second case of foreseen 
consequences associated with what one does. (One notes that historically4 and to this day 
                                                          
3In Intention, Anscombe notes that only negative, prohibitive practical (in the sense of governing 
what we seek and avoid) principles can be universal. She notes that the premise, “Do everything 
conducive to not having a car crash,” is, “an insane,” premise: 
For there are usually a hundred different and incompatible things conducive to not 
having a car crash; such as, perhaps, driving into the private gateway immediately on 
your left and abandoning your car there, and driving into the private gateway 
immediately on your right and abandoning the car there. 
She goes on to note that, “Only negative general premises can hope to avoid insanity of this 
sort.” (1958, section 33, pp. 58-61) 
4The locus classicus of double effect is St. Thomas Aquinas’ discussion of a private individual’s 
act of self-defense that results in the death of his assailant. One finds this in Summa theologiae, 
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typically, while the I/F distinction does apply to what we allow, one finds it principally 
employed in cases of what one causes.)5 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
IIaIIae, q.64, a.7 (Aquinas, 1962). One must note that Aquinas has a very complex account of 
licit killing in general and licit self-defense in particular that grants great import to distinctions 
(and their interaction amongst one another) between: legitimately authorized (public) killing/not 
legitimately authorized killing, self-defense/defense-of-others, private individual/public official, 
and intentionem/praeter intentionem. Absent public authorities granting private individuals the 
authority to kill in self-defense (as, for example, our authorities appear to have done throughout 
the U.S.), the natural law does not grant private individuals the authority to kill intentionally, 
even in self-defense. Public officials, however, may intend to kill in self-defense qua public 
officials. With respect to self and other-defense, Aquinas inherits an account that understands St. 
Augustine to hold (correctly) that one may kill in defense of others but not in defense of self. For 
the former instantiates proper love of neighbor while the latter instances inordinate love of self 
over neighbor. St. Thomas proposes that, properly understood, St. Augustine (and the true 
account) hold that one may defend oneself with the, “moderation of a blameless defense,” as 
long as one does not intend to kill the assailant. If the assailant dies, the defensive act is licit. For 
one has a greater responsibility to preserve one’s own life than that of another. Needless to say, 
Aquinas’ account requires (and merits and repays) much study. For a consideration of Thomas’ 
account, see, e.g., T. A. Cavanaugh (2006, pp. 1-37). 
5The standard use of the distinction in association with double effect concerns cases such as 
tactical bombing that concomitantly kills civilians, hysterectomy of a cancerous gravid uterus 
that concomitantly kills the baby, and palliative terminal sedation that concomitantly kills the 
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Refusals 
 Let’s flesh out the example a little by borrowing a famous case from Bernard Williams: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
patient whose pain is relieved. For a consideration of double effect and allowing, see Cavanaugh 
(2006, pp., 166-177) 
Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American town. Tied up against 
the wall are a row of twenty Indians, most terrified, a few defiant, in front of them several 
armed men in uniform. A heavy man in a sweat_stained khaki shirt turns out to be the 
captain in charge and, after a good deal of questioning of Jim which establishes that he 
got there by accident while on a botanical expedition, explains that the Indians are a 
random group of the inhabitants who, after recent acts of protest against the government, 
are just about to be killed to remind other possible protestors of the advantages of not 
protesting. However, since Jim is an honoured visitor from another land, the captain is 
happy to offer him a guest's privilege of killing one of the Indians himself. If Jim accepts, 
then as a special mark of the occasion, the other Indians will be let off. Of course, if Jim 
refuses, then there is no special occasion, and Pedro here will do what he was about to do 
when Jim arrived, and kill them all. Jim, with some desperate recollection of schoolboy 
fiction, wonders whether if he got hold of a gun, he could hold the captain, Pedro and the 
rest of the soldiers to threat, but it is quite clear from the set_up that nothing of the sort is 
going to work: any attempt at that sort of thing will mean that all the Indians will be 
killed, and himself. The men against the wall, and the other villagers understand the 
situation, and are obviously begging him to accept. What should he do? (Williams, 1982, 
pp. 98-99) 
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Anscombe holds that Jim should obey the absolute prohibition not intentionally to kill the 
innocent. He should not accept the, “guest’s privilege,” of killing one of the Indians. Rather, he 
should refuse to kill the one Indian. Thereby, he will obey the absolute prohibition of not 
murdering. If he does refuse, however, he might appear to bear responsibility for Pedro’s 
murdering of all twenty. Does he, in effect, murder nineteen by not murdering one? If this were 
the case, it would seem that all that is left for him is the weighing up of the evil of his one 
murder versus Pedro’s twenty. Thus, it would seem that Jim ought to murder one in order to 
spare nineteen. 
 The accusation that Jim murders nineteen, however, fails. For while he foresees their 
deaths as inevitably resulting from his refusal, he does not intend the deaths of the nineteen 
either as an end or as a means. Anscombe’s response illustrates both the exculpatory and the 
justificatory character of the I/F distinction. Consider what Anscombe would say to Jim: “No, 
you are no murderer, if the man’s death was neither your aim nor your chosen means, and if you 
had to act in the way that led to it or else do something absolutely forbidden.” (Anscombe, 
1981b, p. 58) 
 In his refusal, Jim does not murder. For, as Anscombe (2005b, p. 262) notes: 
We cannot offer a sharp and simple definition of murder. But there is a central part of its 
extension which can be reasonably well-defined, namely, the intentional killing of the 
innocent. Whenever this is done by rulers, soldiers, terrorists or other violent men, 
reference is made, in reporting it, to the murder of innocent victims. This gives us one of 
our paradigms of the murderer, and constitutes the hard core of the concept of murder.6 
                                                          
6Also, “murder is the deliberate killing of the innocent, whether for its own sake or as a 
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Moreover, as Anscombe remarks, if saving the nineteen requires his deliberately killing 
the one innocent, then in addition to being excused from the accusation of murder, he is 
justified in his refusal. For the only alternative is to murder. Thus, the distinction between 
what one has responsibility for as intended as an end or means and what one has 
responsibility for as foreseen but not intended proves crucial in sustaining exceptionless 
prohibitions. 
 Now, in order to distinguish this kind of case from other salient cases having to do 
with the need for the I/F distinction, I will call it the challenge of retortion. More 
customarily, one might hear it referred to as the moral blackmail case. I prefer ‘retortion’ 
as it shows the almost logical need for the I/F distinction. As Anscombe puts it, without 
the distinction, the “prohibitions will break down.” I would add, under their own weight. 
Of course, the I/F distinction addresses the problem of moral blackmail; I do not deny its 
relevance. A response to the challenge of retortion addresses something much more basic, 
however. That is a logical question; namely, when employed on themselves (and, I would 
                                                                                                                                                                             
means to some further end.” (Anscombe, 1981b, p. 53) Thus, the hard core is the 
intentional killing of the innocent (not simply intentional killing). Anscombe notes (and I 
concur) that public officers may legitimately intend to kill: 
The idea that they [rulers and their subordinates] may lawfully do what they do, but 
should not intend the death of those they attack, has been put forward and, when suitably 
expressed, may seem high-minded. But someone who can fool himself into this twist of 
thought will fool himself into justifying anything, however atrocious, by means of it. 
(1981b, p. 54, note 2) 
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add, on one another, to address cases in which one pits, e.g., adultery over against 
murder), do the absolute prohibitions continue to make sense? For example, the claim 
that “nothing is true” breaks down when applied to itself. Thus, the I/F distinction plays a 
crucial role in addressing the very first challenge that absolute prohibitions face, their 
logical tenability when turned on themselves. 
 The second scenario that Anscombe suggests concerns not what we refuse to do, 
but what we do. As noted, historically and in the contemporary debate, this is actually the 
topography from which double effect first arose. That is, Aquinas first muted the issue of 
double effect and, in his terms the intended/besides intention (intentionem/praeter 
intentionem) distinction as it bears on one’s doing or causing that produces two effects, 
one intended and one besides one’s intention. Let us consider such cases. 
Causings 
 The issue of deaths that one actually causes leads Anscombe to introduce what 
she calls her, “principle of side effects.”7 The role the I/F distinction plays in refusals 
                                                          
7She does so because certain salient abuses of double effect (attributable on the one hand 
to Cartesianism and, on the other, to Proportionalism) make her shy of endorsing double 
effect. For the most salient forms of it she encounters are corrupt. Indeed, Anscombe 
says, “Now, to make an epigram, the corruption of non-Catholic moral thought has 
consisted in the denial of this doctrine, and the corruption of Catholic thought in the 
abuse of it.” (Anscombe, 2005a, p. 247) Also, we read: “we are touching on the principle 
of “double effect”. The denial of this has been the corruption of non-Catholic thought, 
and its abuse the corruption of Catholic thought.” (Anscombe, 1981b, p. 54) For an 
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differs from that it plays in doings. For in retortion we face a logical, conceptual 
challenge, as it were. In causings we face what we may call material or practical 
implications. That is, do common causings violate the exceptionless prohibition? 
 With this question in mind, let us turn to Anscombe. On the occasion of her 
receipt of the Aquinas Medal, Anscombe proposes her, “principle of side-effects”: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
extensive discussion of the relation between her “Principle of Side Effects” and double 
effect, see Cavanaugh, (forthcoming). 
I will call it the ‘principle of side-effects’ that the prohibition on murder does not cover 
all bringing about of deaths which are not intended. Not that such deaths aren’t often 
murder. But the quite clear and certain prohibition on intentional killing (with the 
relevant ‘public’ exceptions) does not catch you when your action brings about an 
unintended death. (original emphasis, Anscombe, 1982, p. 21) 
Given the sensibility of an absolute prohibition against murder, the principle of side-effects (or 
 something like it) becomes necessary. For, otherwise, as Anscombe (1982, p., 20) illustrates the 
point, “you can’t build roads and fast vehicles, you can’t have various sports and races, you can’t 
have ships voyaging over the seas, without its being predictable that there will be deaths 
resulting.” So, the principle of side effects defines the set of cases that are not necessarily wrong 
(as intentional killings of the innocent). As she notes, “the principle is modest: it says ‘where you 
must not aim at someone’s death, causing it does not necessarily incur guilt’.” (original 
emphasis, Anscombe, 1982, p., 20) She elaborates, saying: 
The principle is unexceptionably illustrated by some examples of dangerous surgery, by 
some closings of doors to contain fire or water; or by having ships and airlines. In these 
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we are helped by thinking of the deaths as either remote or uncertain. (1982, p., 21) 
Anscombe notes that the principle of side effects, “does not say when you may foreseeably cause 
death.” (original emphasis, 1982, p., 22) However, the above-mentioned unexceptionable cases 
with reference to the remoteness or uncertainty of the outcomes suggest that we have two 
features to focus upon: the remoteness of the foreseen bad outcome or its uncertainty. 
 Take remoteness first.8 Consider flood doors in a submarine. When closed to prevent the 
deaths of the entire crew (and the submarine’s sinking), the deaths of the submariners in the 
flooded section (although certain) are remote. For one closes the doors and at some remove 
(causally and temporally, subsequent to the compartment’s filling with water), the submariners 
die. The submariners die with certainty, but at some remove from the closing of the doors. 
 Now, take uncertainty. To consider examples Anscombe herself proposes, we 
legitimately fly airplanes, launch ships, build roads and manufacture cars although we know that 
doing so will result in the deaths of innocents. For while those deaths are foreseen with statistical 
certitude they are not individually foreseen as certain. For example, we know with (statistical) 
certitude that given a certain number of flights, a certain number of deaths due to crashes will 
occur. This certitude does not make flying planes a violation of the absolute prohibition against 
murder. Were we, however, to fly a specific plane knowing with certitude that its flying would 
result in the deaths of innocents, we would be culpable of murder, regardless of our not intending 
that result. 
 From the above, it appears as if the principle of side effects complemented by the 
remoteness (not a, “near consequence,”) or lack of certainty of the foreseen outcome secures 
                                                          
8This and the following paragraph rely on Cavanaugh, forthcoming. 
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permissibility of the contemplated action. This appears to me to be the import of Professor 
Anscombe’s principle of side effects whereby the I/F distinction has ethical import insofar as it 
delimits unobjectionable foreseeable causings of the deaths of the innocent.9 We can drive cars, 
close flood and fire doors, fly planes, launch ships, build bridges, perform surgery, and so on. 
For while we foresee deaths concomitant upon such acts as either remote or uncertain, we do not 
intend them either as a means or end. Thereby, we do not violate the prohibition against murder 
in such (otherwise unobjectionable) doings. 
 Thus, along with Anscombe, we see that absolute prohibitions rely on the I/F distinction 
to address questions associated with both acts of refusal and causation. Thereby, we discern 
grounds for granting the I/F distinction moral import. Now, in Anscombe’s work, a third and 
allied basis for the ethical relevance of the I/F distinction can be found in the idea of what I will 
call intrinsic badness. Certainly, the absolute prohibitions concern acts whose badness is found in 
the acts themselves and not, for example, in a weighing up of their consequences. Nonetheless, 
we might distinguish the use of the I/F distinction as it bears on absolute prohibitions (both 
refusals and doings) on the one hand, and the intrinsically bad, on the other, and this for at least 
two reasons. 
 First, even if all and only intrinsically bad acts are absolutely forbidden, the 
denomination differs. That is, we have thus far focused on the absolute nature of the prohibition, 
not the intrinsic badness of the act. Even if materially or referentially the same, conceptually, or 
in terms of sense, this is a distinct item. Simply put, it differs in definition. Second, one might 
                                                          
9For a more extensive consideration of her principle of side effects and how it differs from an 
account of double effect, see Cavanaugh, forthcoming. 
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think that the category of the intrinsically bad is larger than that of the absolutely forbidden. For 
example, it may be the case that breaking a promise is intrinsically bad yet does not rise to the 
level of being absolutely forbidden. Note that this does not mean that it is ethically in the clear to 
break the relevant promise. It only means that the category of absolutely prohibited is a limited 
one meant to capture the most egregious ethical violations. In any case, the category of the 
intrinsically bad instances a third basis for Anscombe’s recourse to the I/F distinction. 
Intrinsic Badness 
 In MMP, Anscombe offers an example illustrative of the import of the I/F distinction as it 
bears on intrinsic badness. I will follow her example in the main, fleshing it out with roles and 
some narrative context. So, on to the example. A grandfather provides money for the care of his 
granddaughter whose father ought to provide money, but does not. The grandfather does this due 
to the death-bed request of his (now-deceased) daughter whose lack of confidence in her husband 
(the girl’s father) as a provider led her to seek such a promise. The granddaughter lives with her 
decent, albeit Micawberish, father. The grandfather pays her tuition at a private all girl’s 
highschool and incidental expenses associated with her extra-curricular activities, including a 
club swim team also requiring monthly payments. The granddaughter, a freshman, thrives at the 
(expensive) school and as a swimmer on her club team. 
 Anscombe stipulates (correctly, I think) that it would be wrong for the grandfather to 
deliberately, purposefully, intentionally withdraw support for either of two reasons. First, as an 
end, simply because he no longer wanted to support her. Second, as a means to the good end of 
compelling her father to support her. Thus, we have the position that the grandfather has a 
serious obligation to support his granddaughter. This remains so even in the case in which by not 
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supporting her he could force her father to do the right thing. The girl’s father, availing himself 
of the grandfather’s promise, neglects to support his daughter financially. 
 Now, to complicate matters, we have a third act to contemplate that implicates support of 
the child. Namely, the grandfather’s doing something disgraceful and continuing to support the 
girl or not doing that disgraceful act and going to jail, and thereby foreseeably but not 
intentionally (either as an end or as a means) withdrawing support. The disgraceful act is not as 
bad as selfishly withdrawing support. So, let us say that the grandfather is an investigative 
journalist who faces the prospect of revealing the identity of his source of information at the 
insistence of a court or contempt of that court and some time in jail during which he cannot 
support his granddaughter. Let us say (and I realize that this claim might be controverted, but I 
do not think it outrageous) that revealing this person’s identity, while disgraceful as a violation 
of his professional ethic and of the trust placed in him, would not be as bad as withdrawing 
support simply because he has tired of the expense and would like to spend money on himself. 
Note that this judgment of the relative badness of the two acts will particularly hold if we assess 
the violation of the journalistic ethic not in terms of its intrinsic badness, but in terms of its 
reasonably expected consequences. (Of course, this is part of Anscombe’s point.) Now, with this 
case in place, what happens if we lack the I/F distinction? Here is Anscombe: 
By Sidgwick’s doctrine, there is no difference in his responsibility for ceasing to maintain 
the child, between the case where he does it for its own sake or as a means to some other 
purpose, and when it happens as a foreseen but unavoidable consequence of his going to 
prison rather than do something disgraceful. It follows that he must weigh up the relative 
badness of withdrawing support from the child and of doing the disgraceful thing; and it 
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may easily be that the disgraceful thing is a less vicious action than intentionally 
withdrawing support from the child would be; if then the fact that withdrawing support 
from the child is a side effect of his going to prison does not make any difference to his 
responsibility, this consideration will incline him to do the disgraceful thing, which can 
still be pretty bad. And, of course, once he has started to look at the matter in this light, 
the only reasonable thing for him to consider will be the consequences and not the 
intrinsic badness of this or that action. So that, given that he judges reasonably that no 
great harm will come of it, he can do a much more disgraceful thing than deliberately 
withdrawing support from the child. (original emphasis, 1958, p., 12) 
For our purposes, the crucial passage comes where Anscombe notes that, “the only reasonable 
thing for him to consider will be the consequences and not the intrinsic badness of this or that 
action.” Absent a focus upon intent contrasted from foresight, the intrinsic badness of this or that 
act plays little to no role in the grandfather’s consideration of what to do. For, intent constitutes 
the intrinsic character of an act – the act itself – in contrast to its reasonably expected 
consequences. Intent being put to the side, we lose the very idea of the intrinsic badness of this or 
that action. (Presumably, the same holds concerning an act’s intrinsic goodness.) What we will 
have left over is broadly voluntarily effected reasonably expected consequences. Thus, our agent 
is left to calculate expected consequences. 
 When he does set about with his calculations, if our illustration holds, he will arrive at the 
decision to reveal his source. But Anscombe suggests that this is not where his consequentialist 
deliberations will end. For, as she says, if the intrinsic badness (at least partially – if not entirely 
– established by intent) of breaking a father’s promise to a dying daughter or violating a 
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profession’s ethic does not matter while only reasonably expected consequences do, then will not 
this grandfather-cum-journalist come to judge that he should simply perjure himself before the 
court? For, thereby, he avoids many reasonably expected bad outcomes (being charged with 
contempt of court, sentenced to some time in jail, no longer being able to pay his 
granddaughter’s expenses, and all the bad effects upon his granddaughter). Conversely, what are 
the reasonably expected consequences of perjuring himself in court? Perjury is rarely found out, 
even more rarely prosecuted, and whom does it harm? Of course, perjury in a court of law on a 
serious matter (such as the contemplated case – courts not pressing their claims against 
journalists lightly) would be a, “much more disgraceful thing,” than deliberately withdrawing 
support from the child. 
 Importantly, Anscombe by means of the distinction between intent and foresight 
introduces a complexity into her example that matches the world (at least as I have come to 
know it), but for which consequentialism has little patience or sensitivity. Indeed, the 
intricateness of the example can be a little vexing (even for a sympathetic reader). For she asks 
us to consider four scenarios, or acts when it comes to our agent. First, one in which he stops 
supporting his granddaughter simply because he tires of doing so. Second, one in which he stops 
supporting her in order to compel her father to do the right thing and support her. Third, one in 
which his abiding by his profession’s ethic and not revealing his journalistic source earns him 
contempt of court and jail time in which he can no longer offer support. Fourth, his act of 
perjuring himself under oath in court. I take it that part of the point of the numerous acts is to 
contrast their intrinsic badness, which can only be got at by means of intent. 
 Consider the different ways in which these four acts are intrinsically bad in contrast to 
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bad in terms of their reasonably expected results. The first act breaks the promise of a father to 
his dying daughter in her role as mother and originates from a callous selfish motive (“I’m done 
writing these endless checks”). In terms of its (reasonably expected) consequences, it distresses 
an adolescent and has a certain probability of getting a father to do the right thing by his 
daughter. The second act breaks the same promise while embodying an admirable intent (“He 
needs to grow up and support his daughter; I am simply enabling him to neglect his financial 
responsibilities towards her”). It also distresses an adolescent and has a similar probability of 
getting a father to do the right thing. The third act of honoring a professional ethic is intrinsically 
admirable; it involves as a foreseen but not intended consequence distressing an adolescent. The 
fourth act involves perjury (more explicitly defined as speaking a falsehood with the intent of 
deceiving) in a serious matter before a court of law while having numerous concrete good 
consequences (avoiding jail time, not revealing a journalistic source, not distressing a young girl) 
and speculative bad ones (the harm that comes from countenancing perjury in court). 
 Absent the I/F distinction and in light of the reasonably expected consequences outlined 
above, we do descend, as Anscombe proposes, into consequentialism. Of course, the 
consequentialist will not regard this as an argument on behalf of the moral import of the 
distinction. Anscombe, however, does. Moreover, she rightly does so insofar as we clearly can 
and readily do assess, respectively, the above four acts in themselves, as selfish, understandable 
but misguided, admirable but costly, and shamefully unjust. Indeed, the I/F distinction captures 
these very aspects of our judgements concerning the above four acts. Consider them in order. 
 First, for our agent to break his promise to his deceased daughter simply because he tires 
of it is selfish, callous, pusillanimous, and greedy. The intent of having more for one’s self at the 
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cost of a needy other defines (and thereby condemns) it. Second, for him to break his promise in 
order to get his former son-in-law to do the right thing – while verging on the honorable – is 
understandable, but misguided. Certainly, the improvident father should support his daughter. 
Moreover, his former father-in-law should try to get him to do so. However, he ought not to use 
the breaking of his promise as a (bad) means to that good end. Third, for a journalist to refuse to 
reveal his source to the court is admirable, heroic, civilized, the kind of liberty on account of 
which men willingly risk their lives and for which songs are written and sung. It is regrettable 
that he and his granddaughter shall suffer for it, but mature decisions come at the expense of 
those who make them. We admire those who make such decisions for what they intentionally do 
while foreseeing the associated costs. Fourth, and finally, to perjure oneself is to say what one 
knows is false with the intent of deceiving. Inherently unjust, it further miscarries and obstructs 
justice. For this reason, the decent consider it disgraceful. 
 The distinction between what we intend as an end or as a means and what we foresee as 
associated with what we intend structures the above act-evaluations. Yet, if we do not contrast 
intent from foresight, we must cast aside the very idea of the intrinsic badness of an act. This 
leaves us bereft of all but consequentialism’s banal approach. In contrast to that gross weighing 
up of consequences, Anscombe proposes a refined moral vocabulary referencing virtue and vice. 
Virtue and vice and their relationship to intent serve as a further basis for the moral import of the 
I/F distinction, as we will now see. 
Intent, Virtue, and Vice 
 At the end of MMP (1958, pp., 8-9), Anscombe proposes that: 
It would be a great improvement if, instead of “morally wrong,” one always names a 
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genus such as “untruthful,” “unchaste,” “unjust.” We should no longer ask whether doing 
something was “wrong,” passing directly from some description of an action to this 
notion; we should ask whether, e.g., it was unjust; and the answer would sometimes be 
clear at once. 
In this memorable passage, Anscombe exhorts us to recover richer act-descriptions than the 
overly general right or wrong, moral/immoral, permissible/impermissible categories. (Not to 
speak of the even more superficial consequentialist, “overall more productive of good than of 
bad”/“overall more productive of bad than of good.”) Rather, she admonishes us to use 
categories such as virtuous/vicious – the actual categories we find ourselves and others 
employing when we speak of acts and agents as honest or deceitful, thoughtful or obtuse, 
considerate or manipulative, generous or selfish, and so on. Earlier in MMP she had noted that 
consequentialism is inevitably a “shallow” philosophy. It is so, in part, because it evaluates acts 
in these very general terms, as right or wrong, or, as all things considered beneficent or 
maleficent. Yet, absent a focus on intent, one has only the voluntary (in Aristotle’s sense of what 
one knows and wills) to determine what is subject to moral evaluation. Now, as Aristotle says, 
decision best instances virtue (and vice). Indeed, as the very definition of virtue indicates, 
deliberate decision exemplifies the essence of virtue (and vice).10 What is deliberate decision? 
Well, another word for it is intent. The intended is what we have deliberately decided upon. It 
concerns our ends and our means to our ends. Hence, intent instances virtue and vice. 
 For example, to consider a few vicious acts, to utter a falsehood with the intention of 
                                                          
10Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, “virtue is a habit of deciding,” “Z •D,J¬ ª>4H BD@"4D,J46Z” 
(1106b36). 
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misleading is deceitful. To treat another solely as a means of venereal pleasure is lustful. To 
speak in order to embarrass is spiteful. To harm another for one’s own delight is sadistic. To 
consider a few virtues, to give with the intent of relieving suffering is tender-hearted or merciful 
(misericordiae). To overcome fear in order to preserve a threatened good is courageous. To tell a 
joke in order to delight is humorous. And so on. Intent captures the virtue or vice of our acts. For 
the deliberately decided upon, the intended, exemplifies virtue and vice. We may find here, too, 
that the opponent parts ways with us and with Anscombe. So be it. Absent the ethical import of 
intent (and, thereby, when relevant, how it differs ethically from foresight), act-evaluations must 
remain shallow, general, and, ultimately, not very informative. In not acknowledging the moral 
import of intent, the consequentialist can speak of acts only as, all things considered, beneficent 
or, all things considered, maleficent. That is, the consequentialist can only say, net, the act 
produced good or, net, the act produced bad. Needless to say, this is a highly impoverished moral 
vocabulary. 
 In the above four reasons for acknowledging the moral import of the I/F distinction (to 
recount them they are: 1) absolute prohibitions: refusals and 2) doings; 3) intrinsic badness; and, 
4) virtue and vice), the consequentialist will probably not find one convincing argument. This 
does not impute the quality of Miss Anscombe’s arguments. Indeed, she would probably take it 
to recommend them, distinctly. Nonetheless, one would like to have some argument to offer 
based on ground shared with the consequentialist. This brings me to the fifth and final 
Anscombian reason for granting the I/F distinction’s moral relevance. I myself believe it is the 
most important reason, but perhaps the least developed in her account, although it remains 
implicit in large portions of her impressive oeuvre. 
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The Presumptive Moral Import of Moral Psychology 
 The final basis for the ethical import of the I/F distinction is not explicitly stated by 
Anscombe. Rather, it is the overall significance of her insistence in MMP that we get a sound 
moral psychology before we do ethics.11 Moral psychology (action theory) investigates the 
ontology of actions and the distinctions of which they admit. In Intention Anscombe speaks of 
our, “special interest in human actions.” (Anscombe, 2000, section 46, p., 83) That special 
interest is called ethics. Ethics evaluates the very actions that moral psychology defines and 
differentiates. Simply put, distinctions of which actions admit (action-theory distinctions) 
presumptively make for differences within act-evaluation (ethics) because, as action-relevant 
distinctions, generally and thereby, they mark morally important differences. Just as distinctions 
amongst living things make for biologically important differences (such as the difference 
between those living things that produce sexually and those that produce a-sexually), and 
distinctions amongst health systems (such as that between respiration and circulation) make for 
important differences amongst physicians (such as that between pulmonoligists and 
                                                          
11A reader familiar with the ponds of ink devoted to the topic of switching trolleys cannot but be 
struck in reading Intention to find: “Switching (on, off)” as exemplifying a description not 
dependent on the, “form of description ‘intentional actions’” (Anscombe, 2000, section 47, p. 
85). The point is not that switching is not an action, nor even that it is not at times an intentional 
action. Anscombe, of course, holds that such a description could apply to an intentional action. 
The point is, rather, that a paradigmatic action in contemporary ethics is one that liminally counts 
as an act. The ethics that preoccupies itself with discussing such impoverished threshold 
instances of action is unlikely to escape a similar poverty in its own act-assessments. 
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cardiologists), so, too, differences amongst acts such as that between the intended and the 
voluntary prima facie make for ethically important differences such as that between 
consequentially comparable terror and tactical bombing. 
 In effect, the consequentialist grants moral import principally to one and only one 
action-theory distinction. That is the distinction between the voluntary and the not voluntary. 
Indeed, ethics is about the voluntary; roughly, what we may refer to along Aristotelian lines as 
knowing-willing. Indubitably, morality assesses what we knowingly and willingly cause or 
allow. This is true, as far as it goes. The problem is that it does not go far enough. For, as 
Anscombe repeatedly shows us, within the voluntary there are important differences. In 
particular, there is the difference between what we might refer to as the intended, on the one 
hand, and the simply voluntary, on the other. Of course, the intended is simply voluntary, so the 
difference is not one of what is present in the voluntary being absent in the intended. Rather, in 
the intended we find ourselves knowing willing our knowing willing. That is, we deliberate 
concerning what we want; upon the completion of deliberation we intend our end and the means 
to it. Intending is one of those acts that we take concerning our own action. It exemplifies the 
properly human act of rising above our own acts and taking them as our object. It resembles the 
way in which we not only know, but we know that we know; we not only want, but we have 
wants concerning our wants (e.g. that they be good). It is in intention that we find the properly 
ethical. By that I mean we are no longer contrasting what is subject to moral appraisal from what 
is not (as we do with the distinction that establishes morality, that between the voluntary and the 
not voluntary.) Rather, we here find distinctions within the voluntary. In this sense, they are 
properly ethical distinctions, occurring entirely within morality. 
ETHICAL RELEVANCE OF THE INTENDED/FORESEEN DISTINCTION  
 
26
 The mind boggles to think that these distinctions would lack ethical relevance, 
considering that they are simply articulations or ramifications of one side of the first morally 
relevant distinction. Namely, that between what is voluntary and is, accordingly, subject to moral 
appraisal and that which is not and is, accordingly, not subject to ethical evaluation. While not 
explicitly stated by Miss Anscombe, this is the point and purpose of her insuperable (and 
countless) contributions to moral psychology and, in turn, to any sound morality. In other words, 
moral psychology is morally important psychology. That this (dare we call it analytic?) point has 
entirely been lost indicates our desperate need for her profound insights. Deeply in her debt we 
remain. 
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